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COMMENTARY
A Social Psychology of Human Rights Rooted in Asymmetric
Intergroup Relations
Christian Staerklé, Alain Clémence, and Dario Spini
University of Lausanne
Reflecting the increasing importance of hu-
man rights (HR) in legal theory and social-
scientific research, psychologists and social sci-
entists have developed an increased interest in
the topic. Although the first systematic social
psychological research that explicitly deals with
HR dates back to the 1990s, particularly that of
Willem Doise and his colleagues (Doise, 2002),
researchers have recently rediscovered both the
political and the scientific importance of a social
psychological analysis of HR. The present spe-
cial issue is a timely and powerful statement of
the relevance of a psychological analysis of HR
and their role in everyday thinking regarding
social inequality, intergroup injustice, and
widespread suffering stemming from armed
conflict, intergroup violence, and rights-
violating authorities. It thereby also reflects a
growing awareness of global issues among psy-
chologists.
The articles enclosed in the special issue of
Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychol-
ogy could appear, at first glance, as a set of
disparate contributions to the social psychology
of human rights. But after reading through all
the contribution, a rich and coherent puzzle
emerges. The diverse theoretical and method-
ological approaches of the four empirical stud-
ies offer a stimulating extension of the general
review opening the issue, and the last contribu-
tion develops a relevant theoretical framework
to integrate and discuss the research. In sum, the
issue shows how (social) psychology power-
fully sheds light on the enormous problems
associated with the respect for and the viola-
tions of elementary rights of people. Basic re-
search in social psychology tells us that we all
are potential executioners when supported by
certainties concerning the moral superiority of
the self and of our group. But, as underlined by
Doise (2002), this pessimistic point of view
does not subsume contrasting research showing
how we can contribute to protecting persons
from mistreatments, discrimination, or oppres-
sion. The set of articles in this issue illustrates
both the optimistic and pessimistic views on the
respect for human rights. We have organized
our commentary around three core points that
are discussed to various degrees in the different
articles, and are central in accounting for the
factors that promote and limit respect for human
rights.
People Support Abstract HR Principles,
but Exclude Bad Individuals
From These Principles
The analysis of HR definitions by lay people
is at the same time an empirical necessity and an
empirical problem. Formally, HR are rights in-
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herent to all human beings independently of
their membership in national, ethnic, religious,
gender, or age categories. They are codified and
guaranteed by law, in the form of declarations,
in particular the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) of 1948, treaties, conven-
tions, resolutions, and other sources of interna-
tional law. Yet, when ordinary people think of
HR, they may not always apply the fundamental
HR principles of universality and indivisibility.
Instead, they reconstruct HR to bring them into
line with everyday constraints and purposes.
The articles in this special issue deal with these
transformations of HR into everyday thinking,
by showing the various ways through which HR
are translated and adapted by lay people.
In his review of empirical research, Sam Mc-
Farland (2015) raises this issue as relating to the
measurement of agreement with HR and dis-
cusses how their level of abstraction determines
agreement with HR. Yet, it is not only a ques-
tion of a higher or lower level of abstraction in
the definition of HR, but also a question of
meaning that is embedded in specific cultural or
linguistic contexts, as demonstrated by Kath-
leen Malley-Morrison, Ross Caputi, Ellen
Gutowski, Tristyn Campbell, and their col-
leagues (2015). Each article in this issue dis-
cusses the problem of the meaning of HR for
ordinary citizens. The articles also address the
vertical gap between abstract definitions and
specific judgments, as well as the horizontal gap
between judgments on different national con-
texts or social groups. This is why Doise and his
colleagues have tackled HR as a social repre-
sentation to analyze the various translations of
the formal definition of the UDHR into ordinary
thinking, showing that the UDHR acts as the
most relevant reference for lay people around
the world. For present purposes, social repre-
sentations can be defined as a form of everyday
knowledge that lay people rely upon to judge
and make up their minds on important social
and political issues (see Clémence, 2001;
Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011; Moscovici,
1961/2008; Staerklé, 2009). One of the corner-
stones of the theory is that we use different
modes of reasoning depending on the con-
straints imposed by different social contexts. In
everyday life, we follow a mode of reasoning
based on the actual thought content and the
necessity of successful communication with
others, while in a specific context such as that of
a working laboratory we have to follow logical
rules and expert thought procedures (Lorenzi-
Cioldi & Clémence, 2001).
It is in the context of such lay thinking de-
scribed by social representations theory that one
may understand why individuals restrict the
universality of HR by accepting HR violations
under certain circumstances and excluding spe-
cific groups from protection against bad treat-
ment. Indeed, as underlined by McFarland
(2015), the universality of a positive attitude
toward HR appears to be restricted to the formal
and abstract definition of HR. When people
evaluate the implementation of HR across dif-
ferent contexts, they become divided and sup-
port restrictions (see also Spini & Doise, 1998;
Staerklé & Clémence, 2004). This is clearly
documented by the studies of Dominic Abrams,
Diane Houston, Julie Van de Vyer, and Milica
Vasilevic (2015), showing that a significant
group of adults (between 15% and 30%) in the
United Kingdom attribute more rights to pater-
nalized groups than to nonpaternalized groups,
even if they claim to endorse equality principles
for all groups.
The restriction of HR appears particularly
dramatic when it concerns one of the most ab-
solute or inalienable rights (Delmas-Marty,
1989), namely the protection against torture and
inhumane or degrading treatment (Article 5 of
the UDHR). McFarland (2015) reports the re-
sults of a large survey conducted in 2008 in 19
countries by the Program on International Pol-
icy Attitudes on the views on torture (Kull et al.,
2008). However, McFarland’s (2015) conclu-
sion about “rather stable between-country dif-
ferences” appears questionable. First of all, it
must be noted that in 2008 the prohibition of
torture was supported by less than half of the
participants in seven countries (Russia, Iran,
Turkey, Nigeria, South Korea, Thailand, and
India) and by more than three quarters in only
three countries (Spain, France, and Great Brit-
ain). The evolution between 2006 and 2008 for
the 15 countries where the same survey was
conducted repeatedly shows a clear increase in
support for allowing the state to use “some
degree of torture if it may gain information that
saves innocent lives” in India, Turkey, and
South Korea, but also in Nigeria and the U.S.
and, in contrast, an increase in the support of the
absolute prohibition of torture in Mexico,
Spain, China, Indonesia, Great Britain, and (to a
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lesser extent) Russia. These results illustrate a
dramatic volatility in the public support for one
of the core human rights when it is defined in a
specific context. They also show strong interna-
tional differences that cannot be fully accounted
for by the proximity of terrorist attacks.
The article by Malley-Morrison and col-
leagues (2015) offers another way to understand
judgments on this classic torture dilemma. The
analysis of the brief narratives provided by the
respondents reveals that, in addition to the na-
tional context of the participants, both moral
reasoning in terms of moral disengagement ver-
sus moral engagement, and membership in an
activist group, shape HR judgments. As a result,
the definition of rights is associated with the
definition of those who deserve the rights
(“good” citizens) and those who should not
benefit from them (“bad” citizens and terror-
ists!).
Dominant Claims for Duties and
Subordinate Claims for Rights
The articles further show how identity and
intergroup processes shape people’s thinking
about and behavior toward HR and thereby also
illustrate the extent to which everyday thinking
is embedded in relations within and between
groups. Following other research (e.g., Cohrs,
Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; Stellm-
acher, Sommer, & Brähler, 2005) and Duckitt’s
(2001) dual process model, McFarland (2015)
highlights the strong negative impact of Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right Wing
Authoritarianism (RWA) on people’s support of
different aspects of HR. With respect to SDO,
these findings suggest that the support of inter-
group inequality specifically decreases support
for the rights of minorities and other marginal-
ized groups, that is, rights that are less consen-
sual and that are contested by significant seg-
ments of the population. The refusal to grant
rights to minorities thereby becomes a strategy
to legitimize intergroup inequality. The nega-
tive effect of RWA on HR support, in turn,
indicates that conventionalism and punitiveness
increase the tendency to exclude non-normative
individuals—that is, those who violate common
group norms—from rights protection. These
two constructs appear to explain most of the
variance of individual differences in attitudes
toward HR, providing a first indication that
group-level beliefs are key to understanding HR
support and rejection.
But other aspects of social identity and inter-
group relations appear in the articles too. Mc-
Farland (2015) introduces this point by showing
the importance of the level of self-categoriza-
tion in the positioning toward HR principles.
The more people endorse a higher level of self-
categorization, up to the human level (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), the
more they favor the universality of HR. When
social identity is defined at a lower level, the
context of intergroup relations introduces some
restrictions in attitudes toward and the applica-
tion of HR principles. Justin Hackett, Allen
Omoto, and Miriam Matthew (2015) propose an
elegant model where the psychological sense of
global community (PSGC) shapes attitudes to-
ward HR concern and behavior and connects
them to self-transcendence values. PSGC may
appear as a form of social identity if we con-
sider the items used by authors, who discuss this
point in their conclusion. Indeed, participants
define themselves as belonging to humanity and
as an interchangeable member of a unique hu-
man group.
However, the positive effect of superordinate
identities is not the only logic at work in the
determination of HR support. HR are by defi-
nition experienced and implemented in asym-
metrical intergroup contexts, between dominant
and subordinate groups, or between victim and
perpetrator groups (e.g., between enemy groups
in an armed conflict, or between the citizenry
and law enforcement authorities). As a result,
both individuals’ own position in asymmetrical
intergroup relations and their subjective posi-
tioning toward minorities and majorities (in
terms of positive or negative attitudes toward
minorities and minority norms) play an impor-
tant role in shaping people’s thinking about HR.
Put differently, HR thinking necessarily in-
volves representations of asymmetric inter-
group antagonisms.
A first indication of the importance of inter-
group asymmetries comes from Hackett and
colleagues’ (2015) finding that the superordi-
nate and supposedly all-inclusive identification
with a human category does not actually include
all humans to the same degree. The results of
Study 2 show that the HR causes that are less
endorsed by participants (union movements,
immigration, and homosexual issues) correlated
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less with PSGC and self-transcendence values.
Participants seem not only less involved in such
causes, but they also seem to differentiate good
and bad causes in HR much like they differen-
tiate good and bad citizens based on their group
membership (Staerklé, 2009). This last inter-
group distinction forms the core argument of the
article by Abrams and colleagues (2015). Based
on a large and representative British sample,
they confirm the existence of a deep gap be-
tween the endorsement of abstract equality val-
ues and concrete support for different minority
groups. Using the stereotype content model
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) to differen-
tiate “good” and “bad” minority groups,
Abrams and colleagues (2015) found that judg-
ments were much more favorable for “paternal-
ized” (i.e., deserving) minorities than for “non-
paternalized” (i.e., undeserving) minorities.
They further suggest that the motivation to con-
trol prejudice decreases the gap and increases
consistency of HR judgments across social
groups. The authors thus articulate the discrim-
ination in HR judgments at two levels: (a) an
intergroup level (equality hypocrisy) based on
the minority status of the groups; and (b) an
individual level (equality inconsistency) based
on the motivation to control prejudice (Plant &
Devine, 1998). Interestingly, the classification
of the target groups largely overlaps with the
differences observed in the study by Hackett
and colleagues (2015).
The distinction introduces a meaningful di-
mension to qualify how social identity inter-
venes in how restrictively HR are attributed. As
Abrams et al. (2015) say, a benevolent or pa-
ternalistic view often qualifies relations with the
good minorities, those who “instigate feelings
of compassion,” at least when they do not too
loudly claim their rights (women, not feminists,
are seen as warm minorities!), whereas a hostile
view defines relations with the bad minorities,
those who are perceived as threatening the
norms of the majority and the dominant group.
One can further note that the hostility to bad
minorities is often a strategic or political rheto-
ric used by dominant groups to protect their
own rights and privileges. For instance, protect-
ing women’s rights against alleged Muslim sex-
ism may be understood as a way to raise aware-
ness of the alleged threat represented by norm
plurality. Such a claim then becomes a way both
to reaffirm the superiority of the norms of the
dominant groups and to legitimize the restric-
tion of minority rights, for example by drawing
media attention to how some Muslim women
dress.
Moreover, the nonpaternalized minorities are
more inclined than the majority and the pater-
nalized minorities to support the equality value,
and appear more externally motivated to control
prejudice. This result should be highlighted,
because it suggests that the motivation to con-
trol prejudice is anchored at least partially in
group norms. Women and Christians appear to
have internalized to a greater degree a nondis-
criminating norm than homosexuals, while the
rejected minorities seem to conform even more
than the majority to the external control of the
norm. In this sense, one could regret that
Abrams and colleagues (2015) have treated
group membership of their participants only as
covariates. One might indeed expect some mod-
eration by this group membership when evalu-
ating ingroup rights or when the ingroup is part
of the equality comparison.
The articles by Malley-Morrison and col-
leagues (2015) and by Grabe and Dutt (2015)
show that active participation in a movement
increases adherence to different facets of HR,
particularly behaviorally. This social movement
approach was chosen in the two contributions
reporting data from people living in Southern
countries, but also from authors who actively
support HR. The results reinforce a social iden-
tity perspective to HR commitment as a repre-
sentation of human relations and as a motivation
for political participation (Elcheroth, Doise, &
Reicher, 2011). The narrative analysis of the
discourses of 13 leaders of a feminist movement
in Nicaragua reports a vivid and impressive
dynamic of the progressive development of HR
during the construction of social identity. The
process emerges from an awareness of oppres-
sion through the experience of a specific unfair
event, continues in the participation in the rev-
olutionary movement by belonging to the
Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, and
finally grows into the construction of a specific
women’s movement for claiming rights and
protecting subordinate (female) minorities
against the dominant (male) majority. The dy-
namic favoring a strong commitment to HR is
not based on self-categorization at a higher-
order human level, as seen elsewhere, but is
supported by a form of subcategorization at a
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lower level to endorse the point of view of a
stigmatized minority. Because members of sub-
ordinate groups have to find ways to transform
a threatening identity, they must consider their
own group as human to claim rights, in partic-
ular when the boundary to the dominant group
is impermeable (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this
case, HR intervene as a means to build a posi-
tive self and a positive social identity. They also
imply recognition of the stigma and involve-
ment in the group to face the stigma (Ethier &
Deaux, 1994; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje,
2002).
These seemingly incompatible findings con-
cerning the positive impact of both superordi-
nate and subordinate levels of categorization on
HR support and commitment are intriguing. It
could be, though, that the specific impact of
these levels of identification depends on the
insertion of individuals in asymmetric inter-
group relations. The dominant majority in
Western countries embodies the dominant HR
norms. If the support for HR on behalf of dom-
inant Westerners rests on identification at the
human level, it could be that this rather abstract
sense of global community reflects the idea that
their own, predominantly White category legit-
imately represents the interests of humanity in
general (Reese, Berthold, & Steffens, 2012).
Consequently, their own Western norms be-
come the standard through which events occur-
ring mainly outside the Western sphere are
judged. For subordinate groups, in turn, com-
mitment to HR requires identification with their
group to be able to claim equality of rights.
Otherwise, subordinate groups would need to
accept the dominant idea that they have to re-
spect the duties defined by the dominant group
before being able to claim rights (cf. the debate
about right and duties in the excellent book
edited by Finkel & Moghaddam, 2005).
This also suggests that minority members, in-
stead of identifying with other groups, need to
engage in a competitive intergroup relation with
the majority to denounce HR violations often
committed by majority groups and institutions,
claim their rights, and ultimately adopt a strategy
for achieving social change. As a result, it may
well be that minorities use HR in a much more
proximal and concrete sense than majorities who
refer to HR in their general and abstract form, and
for whom HR are first of all an outgroup problem
(Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990). This would
mean that fundamentally different processes are at
work when minorities or majorities refer to HR in
their judgments of social reality. As exemplified
by the HR rhetoric employed by the women’s
movement studied by Grabe and Dutt (2015),
minorities use HR to work toward social change,
whereas for majorities HR are more likely a tool
to redirect attention from ingroup problems to
outgroup problems, thereby contributing to the
justification of existing social and political ar-
rangements within their groups.
An analysis of this self-serving and strategic
use of HR in Western political discourse is largely
absent in the special issue. Indeed, there is evi-
dence that HR may at times be used for ethnocen-
tric rather than humanitarian purposes, such as
when HR are used to legitimize interventions
based on strategic goals of Western countries.
Chandler (2002), for example, denounces the hy-
pocrisy of a Western human rights-based foreign
policy allegedly grounded in humanitarian mo-
tives and the defense of universal values. In social
psychology, evidence for an ethnocentric view of
HR comes from research on social representations
of democracy showing that Western respondents
expect non-Western and nondemocratic countries
to be inhabited by disorderly and quarreling in-
habitants, unable to stand up against a crushing
and rights-violating government. Indirectly, then,
HR violations are blamed on the people them-
selves, because they are unable to prevent them
from happening. Western inhabitants, on the other
hand, are seen not only as orderly and peaceful,
but also as free and independent citizens able to
resist any attempts by their democratic govern-
ments to violate their rights (Staerklé, Clémence,
& Doise, 1998; Staerklé, 2005). Overall, these
findings suggest that Westerners employ naïve
theories about democratic and nondemocratic
functioning, based on a normative and idealized
vision of democracy that is purposefully construed
in opposition to nondemocracy.
In these lay theories, HR respect is firmly
anchored in Western democracies whereas HR
violations only occur in non-Western countries.
This justificatory role of democracy has been
investigated in studies on the democracy-as-
value hypothesis. Here, hostile acts committed
by egalitarian-democratic groups against hierar-
chical-nondemocratic groups were perceived as
less illegitimate compared with those commit-
ted in any other victim-perpetrator group con-
figuration (Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, Depui-
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set, & Butera, 2005). Studies specifically
concerned with perceived legitimacy of armed
conflict confirmed this pattern, showing that
democratic military intervention in a nondemo-
cratic country was perceived as the least illegit-
imate, in particular when supported by a dem-
ocratic population (Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé,
Pereira, & Butera, 2012).
In this respect, it is interesting to note that
McFarland’s (2015) measures of HR commit-
ment, the Human Rights Choices Questionnaire
(HRCQ) and the Human Rights Scenarios mea-
sure (HRScene), are both based on support for
U.S. foreign policy intervention, that is, on out-
group HR concerns. Rather than reflecting gen-
eral, altruistic HR support, one could then inter-
pret this measure of HR commitment more
narrowly as a view of HR as a foreign policy
instrument. Indeed, the high correlations between
identification with all humanity and HRCQ and
HRScene could partially also reflect a tendency by
global identifiers to prioritize denunciation of out-
group HR violations rather than to support HR
indiscriminately at home and abroad. Finally, it
should also be noted that only a few large (mostly
Western) countries intervene outside their own
territories, and that HR studies concerned with the
legitimacy of such foreign interventions represent
per se a (majority) view of HR as problems of
“others.”
In Search of New Models
The contribution of Bernhard Leidner and
Mengyao Li (2015) offers a thoroughly docu-
mented theoretical model that allows for integra-
tion of some of the elements of our discussion on
social identity and commitment to HR. In partic-
ular, Leidner and Li (2015) emphasize the impor-
tance of group membership in the development of
a consciousness of violations and subsequently in
the implementation of HR. Even if the theoretical
contribution is restricted, in this article, to post-
conflict situations, the model provides a powerful
tool to review the HR studies from a social psy-
chological perspective that can stimulate new re-
search or even new analyses of existing data by
following the different paths of the model. In this
sense, it constitutes a good answer to McFarland
(2015) who calls for a “guiding theory” capable of
integrating a collection of disparate studies and
empirical results. As discussed earlier, most arti-
cles in the issue articulate two perspectives, one
referring (at least somewhat) to an intergroup dy-
namic, including self-definition as a group mem-
ber, and, more clearly, a second one focusing on
individual differences. It seems to us, at the end of
this special issue, that there is now solid evidence
for the impact of individual measures on the sup-
port of HR, and, thanks to this special issue, for
the regulation of the restriction of HR by a social
identity dynamic that defines everyday thinking.
What appears less convincing can be summarized
in three points.
First, reflecting a more general problem in
attitudinal research, there is a tendency to limit
theoretical innovation to the addition of novel
individual difference variables rather than at-
tempting to develop basic and meaningful the-
oretical models. The dual-process theory of ide-
ology and prejudice of Duckitt (2001) could be
a stimulating base to do this, as indirectly sug-
gested by McFarland (2015).
Second, following Doise’s ideas, the study of
HR implies the articulation of different levels of
analysis, as partially carried out by Abrams and
his colleagues (2015) in this issue. However,
such an articulation supposes to define the rel-
evant level of community in which people act to
understand the norms intervening in their posi-
tioning (Elcheroth, 2006; Elcheroth et al., 2011;
Spini & Doise, 2005). In this regard, HR should
be analyzed as normative principles at work at
different levels of analysis in asymmetric social
interactions. The national level should certainly
be considered, given that national boundaries
encapsulate a set of normative principles
through a common language, a shared historical
memory, and a common law. But other levels
need to be considered too in order to integrate
vertical and horizontal divisions of HR perspec-
tives, not only as targets as in the studies by
Abrams and colleagues (2015) and by Hackett
and colleagues (2015), but also as subjects. By
considering different levels associated with in-
tergroup violence, the Leidner and Li (2015)
model could help define relevant categorization
levels to study the restriction of HR principles
to various groups by other groups and some-
times by their own members. This point is also
important to avoid convenient and imprecise
characterizations of certain intergroup differ-
ences (e.g., “cultural,” “affective” differences).
The third point concerns the articulation be-
tween theoretical and methodological approaches.
By using Bandura’s model of moral disengage-
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ment, Malley-Morrison and her colleagues (2015)
follow a theoretical approach different from the
social identity perspective we have discussed. Of
course, this model is relevant in particular to ex-
amine how people talk and reason about HR.
Furthermore, Malley-Morrison and colleagues
(2015) consider the stimulating work by Lakoff
and Johnson (1980) on metaphors to link the dif-
ferent mechanisms of moral disengagement to
their open-ended technique of questioning. Their
findings provide an important contribution regard-
ing the convergence and divergence of HR con-
tent as well as the sociocognitive thinking fol-
lowed by the participants (see also Curtin &
Steward, 2012; Hoppe-Graff & Kim, 2005). The
polysemy of the HR category—much like other
broad and abstract concepts such as justice or
equality—requires different methodological
perspectives and multiple forms of data collec-
tion to improve our understanding of the posi-
tioning of people toward these concepts. Impor-
tantly, however, this approach also necessitates
a strong theoretical framework able to support
and analyze such data. In this respect, the social
representations perspective could offer a stimu-
lating framework to complement the one pro-
posed by Leidner and Li (2015) to systemati-
cally explore how people translate the abstract
concept of HR into different kinds of specific
and concrete rights and how their membership
in different communities regulates these trans-
lations (Elcheroth et al., 2011; Philogène,
2012).
Conclusion
To conclude, the articles in this special issue
have demonstrated the necessity of questioning
the all too easy consensual agreement with ab-
stract and general HR principles by studying the
substantial variation toward concrete implementa-
tion of these principles. Furthermore, we have
emphasized that everyday HR thinking and be-
havior is often shaped by identity and political
concerns that grow out of asymmetric intergroup
relations. In this sense, the studies suggest that the
way HR are understood and employed by individ-
uals depends to a large extent on the social and
political contexts in which they are enacted. In
particular, it appears crucial to differentiate the
meanings that majorities and minorities associate
with HR and to uncover the multiple rhetorical
uses that can both challenge and support existing
social and political arrangements.
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